The Optimal Access Price in a Vertically Related Industry
AbstractIn important component of the National Competition Policy is the regulation of access prices for major infrastructure facilities. The primary goal of regulation is to protect rival firms from anti-competitive measures of the owners of such facilities. It is commonly held that the regulation of access price does not necessarily benefit the non-integrated downstream rivals, since the access price may act as a collusive device to restrict output in the downstream market that will enhance profits accruing to all competitors. We contest this important finding: we develop a sequential game to examine an industry characterised by naturally monopolistic and potentially competitive activities that are vertically related. We establish that in the perfect Nash equilibrium of the proposed game the intergraded firm has an incentive and an ability to use the access price in the upstream market to the detriment of its rivals. It is hence essential to regulate access prices in such markets to protect non-integrated rivals and to promote competition.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Queensland University of Technology (QUT), School of Economics and Finance in its journal Economic Analysis and Policy (EAP).
Volume (Year): 35 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (March/September)
Firm; Firms; Infrastructure; Policy; Regulation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Partha Gangopadhyay, 2007. "Competitive Tax Evasion And Transfer Prices," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(02), pages 347-351.
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