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Micro-Level Evidence on the Role of MoralHazard in the Asian Financial Crisis

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  • HONIG, Adam

    ()

  • JAIN-CHANDRA, Sonali

    ()

Abstract

This paper examines the role of government guarantees to domestic banks in generating moral hazard in pre-crisis East Asian economies. We test for moral hazard among bank creditors by determining whether protected banks received more funds from creditors than otherwise identical banks that did not enjoy such guarantees. In order to determine empirically the existence of moral hazard among bank managers, we examine whether managers of protected banks assumed more risk than their counterparts at non-protected banks. Using micro-level data, we find strong evidence of moral hazard among bank managers and limited evidence of moral hazard among bank creditors

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Euro-American Association of Economic Development in its journal Applied Econometrics and International Development.

Volume (Year): 6 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages:

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Handle: RePEc:eaa:aeinde:v:6:y:2006:i:1_16

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Related research

Keywords: Moral hazard; Asian financial crisis.;

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References

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  1. Luc Laeven, 2002. "Bank Risk and Deposit Insurance," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 16(1), pages 109-137, June.
  2. Frankel, Jeffrey & Roubini, Nouriel, 2002. "The Role of Industrial Country Policies in Emerging Market Crises," Working Paper Series rwp02-002, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
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  8. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2000. "Lessons from the Asian Crisis," NBER Working Papers 7102, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  11. Chang, Ha-Joon, 2000. "The Hazard of Moral Hazard: Untangling the Asian Crisis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 775-788, April.
  12. Kenneth Kletzer & Robert Dekle, 2001. "Domestic Bank Regulation and Financial Crises," IMF Working Papers 01/63, International Monetary Fund.
  13. Steven Radelet & Jeffrey Sachs, 1998. "The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis," NBER Working Papers 6680, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Sarno, Lucio & Taylor, Mark P., 1999. "Moral hazard, asset price bubbles, capital flows, and the East Asian crisis:: the first tests," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 637-657, August.
  15. McKinnon, Ronald I & Pill, Huw, 1997. "Credible Economic Liberalizations and Overborrowing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 189-93, May.
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  17. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2001. "Financial Policies and the Prevention of Financial Crises in Emerging Market Countries," NBER Working Papers 8087, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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