Balbir Sihag (University of Massachusetts Lowell, Lowell, Mass, USA)
Abstract
Although Kautilya does not provide any formal analysis, his approach contains almost all the ingredients of a game theory. He was certainly not aware of the numerous new jargons, such as sequential rationality, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, subgame perfection, backward induction, and forward induction, which have been added to the vocabulary during the past few decades to study strategic interactions. However, he clearly lays out an extensive form of a game and lists all the possible options available to a king on each node. He incorporates foresight, asymmetric information, and the possibility of ‘time inconsistency’ into his analysis of strategic interactions.
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics in its journal Indian Economic Review.
Find related papers by JEL classification: B11 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Preclassical (Ancient, Medieval, Mercantilist, Physiocratic)