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Ostsee-Pipeline: die Gewinne werden neu verteilt

Author

Listed:
  • Franz Hubert
  • Irina Suleymanova

Abstract

Ende 2005 vereinbarten die deutschen Energieunternehmen E.ON und Wintershall gemeinsam mit der russischen Gazprom eine neue Pipeline "Nord-Stream" zu bauen, mit der russisches Erdgas erstmalig direkt durch die Ostsee nach Deutschland geliefert werden kann. Diese Pipeline erhöht die Sicherheit der westeuropäischen Energieversorgung, weil sie Ausweichmöglichkeiten schafft, falls Konflikte mit den derzeitigen Gas-Transitländern zu Lieferstörungen führen. Damit verschiebt sie zugleich die Verhandlungsmacht zugunsten Russlands und der westeuropäischen Erdgasimporteure. Insbesondere Weißrussland und die Ukraine werden künftig niedrigere Transiterlöse akzeptieren müssen und kaum Sonderkonditionen für eigene Erdgasimporte mehr durchsetzen können. Die Entscheidung für den Bau der Pipeline kann als Folge institutioneller Schwächen in diesen beiden Transitländern erklärt werden.

Suggested Citation

  • Franz Hubert & Irina Suleymanova, 2009. "Ostsee-Pipeline: die Gewinne werden neu verteilt," DIW Wochenbericht, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 76(7), pages 114-120.
    • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwwob:76-7-1
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Tsatsos, Aristidis, 2012. "Die Liberalisierung des russischen Gassektors: 3 Szenarios? [The liberalisation of the Russian gas sector: 3 scenarios?]," MPRA Paper 44623, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multilateral bargaining; Hold-up; Irreversible investment; Collusion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L95 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Gas Utilities; Pipelines; Water Utilities
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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