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Transparenz von Riester-Produkten: theoretische Fundierung und Befunde einer Anbieterbefragung

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  • Johannes Leinert
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    Abstract

    The market for state-sponsored private pension schemes in Germany ("Riester-Rente") is not transparent. This article explains why the problem of asymmetric information, which disadvantages consumers, needs governmental regulation as the problems cannot be resolved by the market. A survey shows that even Riester pension providers support obligatory information like standardized product information sheets. Further, the current legislative debate concerning these standardized information sheets is outlined. The article concludes that while product information sheets are a good way to increase transparency in the market, it should be accompanied with simplified products, financial education, and elimination of disincentives for pension consultants. Der Markt für Riester-Produkte ist intransparent. In diesem Artikel wird gezeigt, warum die Informationsasymmetrien zu Lasten der Verbraucher nicht durch den Markt aufgelöst werden können, sondern nur durch staatliche Vorgaben. Eine empirische Erhebung verdeutlicht, dass auch die Produktanbieter Informationspflichten wie ein standardisiertes Produktinformationsblatt befürworten. Ein solches wird derzeit vom Gesetzgeber geplant; dazu wird der aktuelle Diskussionsstand zusammengefasst. Im Ergebnis wird das standardisierte PIB als der richtige Weg zur Herstellung von mehr Produkttransparenz angesehen, das jedoch durch ergänzende Maßnahmen wie Produktvereinfachung, finanzielle Bildung und den Abbau von Fehlanreizen in der Vorsorgeberatung begleitet werden sollte.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its journal Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung.

    Volume (Year): 81 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 2 ()
    Pages: 55-69

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    Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:81-2-5

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    Related research

    Keywords: Private pension scheme; regulation; information obligation; asymmetric information; adverse selection; principal agent; survey;

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