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Abstract

Die Preise für wissenschaftliche, technische und medizinische (WTM) Fachzeitschriften sind in den letzten 20 Jahren dramatisch gestiegen. Die unterschiedlichen Preisentwicklungen zwischen kommerziellen und nichtkommerziellen Verlagen ist dabei nicht durch unterschiedliche Kostenentwicklungen zu erklären. Vielmehr haben die forschungsorientierten Top-Journale Marktmacht, da sie den Charakter positionaler Güter haben, die von Bibliotheken nur sehr schwer substituiert werden können, sodass streng genommen aufgrund der Einzigartigkeit jedes einzelnen Artikels jede Top-Zeitschrift einen eigenen Markt konstituiert. Top-Zeitschriften haben aus drei Gründen einen erheblichen Preissetzungsspielraum: Erstens sind der Markteintritt und die Ablösung teurer Top-Journale aufgrund des Koordinationsproblems zwischen Autoren, Gutachtern und Bibliotheken für neue Zeitschriften sehr schwierig. Zweitens haben Bibliotheken Wechselkosten (durch die Tendenz, vollständige Reihen zu beziehen). Drittens ist die Nachfrage auch aufgrund der kollektiven Entscheidungsfindung in Bibliotheken relativ unelastisch. Ein effektiver Ausweg, der die Verlage disziplinieren würde, könnte die konzertierte Aktion von Forschungsgemeinschaften sein, die ihre Mitarbeiter oder die von ihnen finanziell geförderten Wissenschaftler verpflichten, ihre Artikel und Forschungsergebnisse kostenfrei oder zumindest zu günstigen Konditionen zur Verfügung zu stellen.

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File URL: http://ejournals.duncker-humblot.de/doi/pdf/10.3790/vjh.74.3.85
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its journal Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung.

Volume (Year): 74 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 85-107
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:74-3-10

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References

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   • Farrell, Joseph & Klemperer, Paul, 2006. "Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects," CEPR Discussion Papers 5798, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    • Glenn Ellison, 2002. "The Slowdown of the Economics Publishing Process," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(5), pages 947-993, October.
13. Laband, David N, 1990. "Is There Value-Added from the Review Process in Economics? Preliminary Evidence from Authors," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 341-52, May.
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