Need for Reform of EU Banking: Decoupling the Solvency of Banks and Sovereigns
AbstractRecent developments in Ireland, Greece, and Spain have shown that sovereign debt crises endanger the solvency of domestic banking sectors, while banking crises in turn endanger the solvency of the domestic sovereigns. This diabolic loop between government and bank solvency is exacerbated by the home bias in banks' government bond portfolios, that is, banks' excessive exposure to domestic sovereign debt. Neither current European banking regulation nor plans to implement Basel III in the EU take this interdependence into account. Both treat government bonds of Member States as risk-free, highly liquid assets and exclude them from capital requirements and large exposure regimes. Future EU banking regulation should aim to remedy this. Consequently, EU government bonds could be given risk weights specific to each country. At least in the Euro area, however, a strict limitation of bank investments to cross-border sovereign debt without country-specific risk would be more effective. The advantage of this reform is that it could be integrated into a variety of scenarios for future government refinancing in the Euro area.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its journal DIW Economic Bulletin.
Volume (Year): 2 (2012)
Issue (Month): 11 ()
Basel III; Sovereign debt; Financial contagion; Diabolic loop;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
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- Franziska Bremus, 2013. "Cross-Border Banking, Bank Market Structures and Market Power: Theory and Cross-Country Evidence," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1344, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Franziska Bremus & Claudia M. Buch, 2013.
"Granularity in Banking and Growth: Does Financial Openness Matter?,"
Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin
1346, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Franziska Bremus & Claudia M. Buch, 2013. "Granularity in Banking and Growth: Does Financial Openness Matter?," CESifo Working Paper Series 4356, CESifo Group Munich.
- F. Bremus & Claudia M. Buch, 2013. "Granularity in Banking and Growth: Does Financial Openness Matter?," IWH Discussion Papers 14, Halle Institute for Economic Research.
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