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L’impact de l’affectation du free cash flow sur la création de valeur actionnariale : le cas de la politique d’endettement et de dividendes des entreprises françaises cotées

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  • Thierry Poulain-Rehm

    ()
    (Université de Bordeaux 4)

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    Abstract

    (VF)Selon la théorie du free cash flow, l’endettement, tout comme la distribution de dividendes, en réduisant le free cash flow, permettraient de limiter le pouvoir discrétionnaire des dirigeants, et contribueraient à la création de valeur actionnariale. Cette théorie est infirmée par cette recherche selon laquelle l’affectation du free cash flow au service du remboursement de la dette exerce une influence négative, statistiquement significative, sur la richesse des actionnaires. Dans le même temps, l’impact d’un réinvestissement des fonds discrétionnaires sous forme de distribution de dividendes n’est pas décelable.(VA) Theory states that managers of low growth/high free cash flow firms engage in non-value-maximizing activities. Jensen (1986) argues debt, like dividends, mitigate the non-value-maximizing activities by reducing the level of free cash flow and hence contribute to shareholder value. However, this research shows that the payout of cash flow in excess, either in the form of debt service, or in the form of dividends, has no positive influence on shareholder value. These conclusions would thus infirm the implications of Jensen’s hypothesis.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by revues.org in its journal Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie.

    Volume (Year): 8 (2005)
    Issue (Month): 4 (December)
    Pages: 205-238

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    Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:8:y:2005:i:q4:p:205-238

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    Related research

    Keywords: free cash flow; coûts d’agence; endettement; distribution de dividendes; valeur actionnariale; free cash flow; agency costs; debt; dividends; shareholder value.;

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    1. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 5554, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Smith, Clifford Jr. & Watts, Ross L., 1992. "The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 263-292, December.
    3. Skinner, Douglas J., 1993. "The investment opportunity set and accounting procedure choice : Preliminary evidence," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 407-445, October.
    4. Fama, Eugene F. & French, Kenneth R., 2001. "Disappearing dividends: changing firm characteristics or lower propensity to pay?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 3-43, April.
    5. Stephen C. Vogt, 1997. "Cash Flow and Capital Spending: Evidence from Capital Expenditure Announcements," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 26(2), Summer.
    6. Nohel, Tom & Tarhan, Vefa, 1998. "Share repurchases and firm performance:: new evidence on the agency costs of free cash flow," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 187-222, August.
    7. Bizjak, John M. & Brickley, James A. & Coles, Jeffrey L., 1993. "Stock-based incentive compensation and investment behavior," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 349-372, April.
    8. Murphy, Kevin J., 1985. "Corporate performance and managerial remuneration : An empirical analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 11-42, April.
    9. Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 134-39, May.
    10. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
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