Franco A. Grassini () (Université LUISS.Guido Carli de Rome)
Abstract
This paper aims to explain the Italian system peculiarities which cast some doubts on convergence of national corporate governance systems. Italian non-financial companies listed on the Stock Exchange play a relatively small role. Most Italian companies are organised as formal or informal groups. The market for corporate control is very small. Control, based on majority or minority, by a powerful individual will prevail in most Italian companies also in the foreseeable future. The real problem for the future of Italian corporate governance is the ability of the Italian economy to develop on the basis of small and medium firms.
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Volume (Year): 4 (2001) Issue (Month): 3 (September) Pages: 147-182 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Find related papers by JEL classification: G39 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Other P19 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Other