Padma Rao Sahib (University of Groningen) Xinhua Gu (University of Toronto)
Abstract
This paper introduces imperfect information, learning, and risk aversion in a two sided matching model. The model provides a theoretical framework for the commonly occurring phenomenon of cohabitation followed by marriage, and is consistent with empirical findings on these institutions. The paper has three major results. First, individuals set higher standards for marriage than for cohabitation. When the true worth of a cohabiting partner is revealed, some cohabiting unions are converted into marriage while others are not. Second, individuals cohabit within classes. Third, the premium that compensates individuals for the higher risk involved in marriage over a cohabiting partnership is derived. This premium can be decomposed into two parts. The first part is a function of the individual's level of risk aversion, while the second part is a function of the difference in risk between marriage and cohabitation.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Article provided by Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany in its journal Demographic Research.
Find related papers by JEL classification: J1 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: