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A Game Theory Approach for Product Specialization in International Trade

Author

Listed:
  • Ioana-Veronica ALEXA

    (Dunarea de Jos University of Galati, România)

  • Simona-Valeria TOMA

    (Dunarea de Jos University of Galati, România)

  • Daniela SARPE

    (Dunarea de Jos University of Galati, România)

Abstract

Game theory, in its most basic form, considers two players and analyses the different strategies that they can use and the effect that these strategies will have on each player. International trade allows countries to use better their resources (labor, technology or capital). Since countries have different capital or natural resources, some of them will produce a good more efficiently than others and therefore could sell it cheaper than other countries. By using game theory in international trade we could determine if the H-O-S model is correct and what would be the best specialization for each country.

Suggested Citation

  • Ioana-Veronica ALEXA & Simona-Valeria TOMA & Daniela SARPE, 2011. "A Game Theory Approach for Product Specialization in International Trade," Risk in Contemporary Economy, "Dunarea de Jos" University of Galati, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, pages 26-32.
    • Handle: RePEc:ddj:fserec:y:2011:p:26-32
    as

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    File URL: http://www.rce.feaa.ugal.ro/images/stories/RCE2011/economics/IVAlexa_SVToma_DSarpe.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December.
    2. William A. Kerr & James D. Gaisford (ed.), 2007. "Handbook on International Trade Policy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3521.
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