A note on existence of mixed solutions to equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints
AbstractA generalization of classical Stackelberg game concept leads to a new class of equilibrium games with hierarchical structure. The existence of equilibria in this class of problems is complicated due to the lack of convexity of the problem. Therefore, under the implicit programming approach, we apply the well-known existence result for solution in mixed strategies for (one-level) Nash equilibrium games. Further, we discuss the use of these results for the case when a solution map of the lower-level problem is multi valued.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The Czech Econometric Society in its journal Bulletin of the Czech Econometric Society.
Volume (Year): 14 (2007)
Issue (Month): 24 ()
equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints; variational analysis; mixed strategy;
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jozef Barunik).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.