Taxing Capital Income As Pigouvian Correction: The Role Of Discounting The Future
AbstractIn this work, we find that the zero capital income tax result might not hold, even at the steady state, when the government discount rate differs from the individual one. As intuitive Pigouvian considerations would suggest, capital income should be taxed (subsidized) when the government is less (more) impatient than individuals are. However, a counterintuitive asymmetry emerges as for the steady state since, in the long run, capital income cannot be taxed because of the explosive distortionary effect of positive taxes. The asymmetry is ruled out with a logarithmic utility function because, in this case, the anticipated policy path does not affect current individual choices and thus the cumulative distortionary effect of taxes disappears.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal Macroeconomic Dynamics.
Volume (Year): 9 (2005)
Issue (Month): 04 (September)
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