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The Role of Asset Structure, Ownership Structure, and Takeover Defenses in Determining Acquisition Likelihood

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Author Info
Ambrose, Brent W.
Megginson, William L.

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Abstract

This paper extends the Palepu (1986) acquisition likelihood model by incorporating measures of insider and institutional shareholdings, by examining the deterrent effect of various takeover defenses, and by considering the effect of varying proportions of fixed (tangible) assets in a firm's total asset structure. We find that the probability of receiving a takeover bid is positively related to tangible assets, and negatively related to firm size and to the net change in institutional holdings. Blank-check preferred stock authorizations are the only common takeover defense significantly (negatively) correlated with acquisition likelihood.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.

Volume (Year): 27 (1992)
Issue (Month): 04 (December)
Pages: 575-589
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Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:27:y:1992:i:04:p:575-589_00

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  1. Panayotis Dessyllas & Alan Hughes, 2005. "The Revealed Preferences of High Technology Acquirers: An Analysis of the Characteristics of their Targets," Industrial Organization 0507009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  2. Bhimani, Al & Hausken, Kjell & Ncube , Mthuli, 2009. "Agent Takeover Risk of Principal in Outsourcing Relationships," UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2009/2, University of Stavanger. [Downloadable!]
  3. Burkart, Mike & Gromb, Denis & Panunzi, Fausto, 2005. "Minority Blocks and Takeover Premia," CEPR Discussion Papers 5240, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Nuria Alcalde Fradejas & Inés Pérez-Soba Aguilar, 2007. "Influencia de las ofertas públicas de adquisición sobre el empleo de las empresas adquiridas: un análisis empírico," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 31(1), pages 5-42, January. [Downloadable!]
  5. James M. Mahoney & Chamu Sundaramurthy & Joseph T. Mahoney, 1995. "The differential impact on stockholder wealth of various antitakeover provisions," Research Paper 9512, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  6. Bodnaruk, Andriy & Massa, Massimo & Simonov, Andrei, 2008. "Investment Banks as Insiders and the Market for Corporate Control," CEPR Discussion Papers 6953, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Ana Isabel Fernandez & Silvia Gomez, 1997. "La adopción de acuerdos estatutarios antiadquisición. Evidencia en el mercado de capitales español," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 21(1), pages 129-138, January. [Downloadable!]
  8. Lily Qiu & Hong Wan, 2006. "Selection or Influence? Institutional Investors and Acquisition Targets," Working Papers 2006-25, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Gary Gorton & Matthias Kahl & Richard Rosen, 2005. "Eat or Be Eaten: A Theory of Mergers and Merger Waves," NBER Working Papers 11364, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Martynova, M. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2008. "What Determines the Financing Decision in Corporate Takeovers: Cost of Capital, Agency Problems or the Means of Payment?," Discussion Paper 2008-66, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Ferreira, Daniel & Ferreira, Miguel A. & Raposo, Clara C., 2008. "Board Structure and Price Informativeness," CEI Working Paper Series 2008-4, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
  12. Charlie Weir & David Laing, 2003. "Ownership structure, board composition and the market for corporate control in the UK: an empirical analysis," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 35(16), pages 1747-1759, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Mara Faccio & Rajdeep Sengupta, 2006. "Corporate response to distress: evidence from the Asian financial crisis," Working Papers 2006-044, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. [Downloadable!]
  14. Panayotis Dessyllas & Alan Hughes, 2005. "The revealed preferences of high technology acquirers: an analysis of the characteristics of their targets," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp306, ESRC Centre for Business Research. [Downloadable!]
  15. Molin, Johan, 1996. "Optimal deterrence and inducement of takeovers: An analysis of poison pills and dilution," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 102, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  16. Trimbath, S. & Frydman, H. & Frydman, R., 2000. "Corporate Inefficiency and the Risk of Takeover," Working Papers 00-14, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  17. Nuria Alcalde Fradejas & Manuel Espitia Escuer & Jaime Vallés Giménez, . "El mercado para el control de empresas en España. Identificación de las empresas objetivo de OPA," Studies on the Spanish Economy 159, FEDEA. [Downloadable!]
  18. Robert Comment & G. William Schwert, 1995. "Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the Deterrent and Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures," NBER Working Papers 4316, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  19. Piet Eichholtz & Nils Kok, 2008. "How Does the Market for Corporate Control Function for Property Companies?," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 141-163, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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