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Jacksonian Monetary Policy, Specie Flows, And The Panic Of 1837

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  • Rousseau, Peter L.

Abstract

A number of hypotheses attempt to disentangle the true causes of the Panic of 1837 from domestic and international factors that came into play as the crisis approached. I analyze U.S. government documents and contemporary newspapers to reconsider the role of domestic factors. These sources place neither the official distribution of the federal surplus nor an international shock at the center. Rather, a series of interbank transfers of government balances and a policy-induced increase in the demand for coin in the Western states drained the largest New York City banks of their specie reserves and rendered the panic inevitable.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal The Journal of Economic History.

Volume (Year): 62 (2002)
Issue (Month): 02 (June)
Pages: 457-488

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Handle: RePEc:cup:jechis:v:62:y:2002:i:02:p:457-488_00

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  1. John W. Kendrick, 1961. "Productivity Trends in the United States," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number kend61-1, July.
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Cited by:
  1. Charles W. Calomiris, 2009. "Banking Crises and the Rules of the Game," Working Papers 2009/14, Czech National Bank, Research Department.
  2. Matthew Jaremski & Peter L. Rousseau, 2012. "Banks, Free Banks, and U.S. Economic Growth," NBER Working Papers 18021, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Michael D. Bordo & David C. Wheelock, 2004. "Monetary Policy and Asset Prices: A Look Back at Past U.S. Stock Market Booms," NBER Working Papers 10704, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Peter L. Rousseau, 2013. "Politics on the road to the U.S. monetary union," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 13-00006, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  5. Young, Andrew T. & Dove, John A., 2013. "Policing the chain gang: Panel cointegration analysis of the stability of the Suffolk System, 1825–1858," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 182-196.
  6. Wallis, John Joseph, 2003. "The property tax as a coordinating device: Financing Indiana's Mammoth Internal Improvement System, 1835-1842," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 223-250, July.
  7. John Joseph Wallis, 2006. "The Concept of Systematic Corruption in American History," NBER Chapters, in: Corruption and Reform: Lessons from America's Economic History, pages 23-62 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. repec:van:wpaper:vuecon-sub-12-00014 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Bordo, Michael D., 2012. "Could the United States have had a better central bank? An historical counterfactual speculation," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 597-607.
  10. John Joseph Wallis, 2001. "The Property Tax as a Coordinating Device: Financing Indiana's Mammoth Internal Improvement System, 1835 to 1842," NBER Historical Working Papers 0136, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Charles W. Calomiris, 2007. "Bank Failures in Theory and History: The Great Depression and Other "Contagious" Events," NBER Working Papers 13597, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Edward L. Glaeser, 2013. "A Nation of Gamblers: Real Estate Speculation and American History," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(3), pages 1-42, May.
  13. John Joseph Wallis, 2004. "The Concept of Systematic Corruption in American Political and Economic History," NBER Working Papers 10952, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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