Clearinghouse Membership and Deposit Contraction during the Panic of 1907
AbstractWas clearinghouse membership a key factor mitigating withdrawals hm intermediaries during the Panic of 1907? Analyzing balance sheet information on institutions in New York and Chicago, we find evidence that clearinghouse members had smaller contractions in demand deposits than did nonmembers. New York City trusts, isolated from the clearinghouse, were subject to heightened perceptions of risk, and suffered large-scale withdrawals because they were outside of the clearinghouse and therefore much less prepared to withstand large-scale depositor runs. We suggest that this aspect of the Panic of 1907 helped to forge support for the creation of a U.S. central bank.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal The Journal of Economic History.
Volume (Year): 60 (2000)
Issue (Month): 01 (March)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: The Edinburgh Building, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 2RU UK
Fax: +44 (0)1223 325150
Web page: http://journals.cambridge.org/jid_JEHProvider-Email:firstname.lastname@example.org
Other versions of this item:
- Moen, Jon R. & Tallman, Ellis W., 2000. "Clearinghouse Membership and Deposit Contraction during the Panic of 1907," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(01), pages 145-163, March.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Hoag, Christopher, 2005. "Deposit drains on "interest-paying" banks before financial crises," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 567-585, October.
- Bernstein, Asaf & Hughson, Eric & Weidenmier, Marc D., 2010. "Identifying the effects of a lender of last resort on financial markets: Lessons from the founding of the fed," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 40-53, October.
- Gary Gorton & Lixin Huang, 2002.
"Bank Panics and the Endogeneity of Central Banking,"
Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers
02-29, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- Gorton, Gary & Huang, Lixin, 2006. "Bank panics and the endogeneity of central banking," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 1613-1629, October.
- Gary Gorton & Lixin Huang, 2002. "Bank Panics and the Endogeneity of Central Banking," NBER Working Papers 9102, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Tallman, Ellis W & Wicker, Elmus R., 2009.
"Banking and Financial Crises in United States History: What Guidance can History Offer Policymakers?,"
21839, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ellis W. Tallman & Elmus R. Wicker, 2010. "Banking and financial crises in United States history: what guidance can history offer policymakers?," Working Paper 1009, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
- Asaf Bernstein & Eric Hughson & Marc D. Weidenmier, 2008. "Can a Lender of Last Resort Stabilize Financial Markets? Lessons from the Founding of the Fed," NBER Working Papers 14422, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Daniel Sanches, 2013. "On the welfare properties of fractional reserve banking," Working Papers 13-32, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Ellis W. Tallman, 2012. "The Panic of 1907," Working Paper 1228, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
- Daniel R. Sanches, 2013. "Banking crises and the role of bank coalitions," Working Papers 13-28, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Margaret Jacobson & Ellis W. Tallman, 2013. "Liquidity provision during the crisis of 1914: private and public sources," Working Paper 1304, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
- Michael D. Bordo & Angela Redish & Hugh Rockoff, 2011. "Why didn’t Canada have a banking crisis in 2008 (or in 1930, or 1907, or ...)?," NBER Working Papers 17312, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Reinhart, Carmen & Felton, Andrew, 2009. "The first global financial crisis of the 21st century: Part II, June-December, 2008," MPRA Paper 13604, University Library of Munich, Germany.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Keith Waters).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.