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Alliances, Internal Information, and Military Conflict Among Member-States

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  • Bearce, David H.
  • Flanagan, Kristen M.
  • Floros, Katharine M.

Abstract

We offer a theory explaining how alliances as international security regimes reduce military conflict between member-states through their internal provision of information concerning national military capabilities. Bargaining models of war have shown that a lack of information about relative military capabilities functions as an important cause of war. We argue that alliances provide such information to internal participants, and greater knowledge within the alliance about member-state military capabilities reduces certain informational problems that could potentially lead to war. This internal information effect, however, is a conditional one. We posit that the information provided within the alliance matters most for dyads at or near power parity: the cases where states are most uncertain about who would prevail if a military conflict did emerge. In power preponderant dyads where the outcome of a potential military conflict is relatively certain, the internal information provided by military alliances becomes less important. Our statistical results provide strong support for these theoretical arguments.Our greatest thanks go to Ashley Leeds, who made available an advance copy of the ATOP 3.0 data set. This article also benefited from presentations at the University of Wisconsin and at ISA-South in Columbia, S.C. Finally, we thank Lisa Martin, two anonymous reviewers, Scott Gehlbach, Chuck Gochman, Zaryab Iqbal, George Krause, Pat McDonald, Jon Pevehouse, Bill Reed, Kevin Sweeney, and Harrison Wagner for their detailed comments and/or suggestions.

Suggested Citation

  • Bearce, David H. & Flanagan, Kristen M. & Floros, Katharine M., 2006. "Alliances, Internal Information, and Military Conflict Among Member-States," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(3), pages 595-625, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:60:y:2006:i:03:p:595-625_06
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    Cited by:

    1. Yener Kandogan & Jens Hiller, 2018. "Alliances in international governmental organizations, regional trade agreement formation, and multinational enterprise regionalization strategy," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 49(6), pages 729-742, August.
    2. Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath, 2018. "To Deter Or To Moderate? Alliance Formation In Contests With Incomplete Information," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(3), pages 1447-1463, July.
    3. Brenton Kenkel, 2019. "The efficacy of cheap talk in collective action problems," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(3), pages 370-402, July.
    4. Kai Konrad, 2012. "Information alliances in contests with budget limits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 679-693, June.
    5. Geoffrey P.R. Wallace, 2008. "Alliances, Institutional Design, and the Determinants of Military Strategy," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 25(3), pages 224-243, July.
    6. Megan Shannon, 2009. "Preventing War and Providing the Peace?," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 26(2), pages 144-163, April.
    7. Casper Sakstrup, 2021. "What’s going on next door? Irregular leader change in neighboring countries, uncertainty, and civil war," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 58(3), pages 539-553, May.
    8. Sam R. Bell, 2013. "What you don’t know can hurt you: Information, external transparency, and interstate conflict, 1982–1999," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 30(5), pages 452-468, November.

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