Political Parties and Monetary Commitments
AbstractWe argue that political parties will choose monetary institutions inorder to help them win elections and retain of ce. Increased levels ofeconomic openness in the industrial democracies have complicated thepursuit of of ce by altering the policy preferences of constituents anddecreasing the ability of cabinet ministers to deliver promised economicoutcomes. We contend that monetary commitments can help politicalparties manage diverse constituent interests, restore policyeffectiveness, and, ultimately, maintain their position in of ce.Therefore, we expect that xed exchange rates and central bankindependence can improve cabinet durability, especially under conditionsof economic openness.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal International Organization.
Volume (Year): 56 (2002)
Issue (Month): 04 (September)
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- S. Brock Blomberg & Jeffry Frieden & Ernesto Stein, 2005. "Sustaining fixed rates: The political economy of currency pegs in Latin America," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 203-225, November.
- Christopher W. Crowe, 2006. "Goal-Independent Central Banks," IMF Working Papers 06/256, International Monetary Fund.
- Jesse Russell, 2011. "Hidden patterns in exchange rate regime choice," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 425-449, April.
- Berdiev, Aziz N. & Kim, Yoonbai & Chang, Chun Ping, 2012. "The political economy of exchange rate regimes in developed and developing countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 38-53.
- Crowe, Christopher, 2008. "Goal independent central banks: Why politicians decide to delegate," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 748-762, December.
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