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Political Parties and Monetary Commitments

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  • Bernhard, William
  • Leblang, David

Abstract

Increased levels of economic openness in the industrial democracies have heightened the potential for intra-party and intra-coalition policy conflicts, hurting the ability of parties to win and retain office. We argue that politicians can use monetary commitments to help manage these conflicts and improve cabinet durability. To determine the political value of these commitments, we test the effect of fixed exchange rates and central bank independence on cabinet durability using a set of 193 cabinets in sixteen parliamentary democracies across the period 1972–98. The results indicate that monetary commitments are associated with higher cabinet durability, particularly for coalition governments. We then use the results of our statistical models to generate expected cabinet durability under alternative institutional configurations. By comparing these expected values, we show that actual monetary reforms in the industrial democracies have helped (or at least not hurt) the ability of political parties to remain in office.

Suggested Citation

  • Bernhard, William & Leblang, David, 2002. "Political Parties and Monetary Commitments," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 803-830, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:56:y:2002:i:04:p:803-830_44
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    Cited by:

    1. Carsten Hefeker, 2019. "Political polarization, term length and too much delegation," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 50-69, March.
    2. S. Brock Blomberg & Jeffry Frieden & Ernesto Stein, 2005. "Sustaining fixed rates: The political economy of currency pegs in Latin America," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 8, pages 203-225, November.
    3. Ana Carolina Garriga, 2016. "Central Bank Independence in the World: A New Data Set," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(5), pages 849-868, October.
    4. Muhammad Naveed TAHIR & Faran ALI & Dawood MAMOON, 2016. "Appropriate Exchange Rate Regime for Economic Structure of Pakistan," Turkish Economic Review, KSP Journals, vol. 3(4), pages 629-641, December.
    5. Berdiev, Aziz N. & Kim, Yoonbai & Chang, Chun Ping, 2012. "The political economy of exchange rate regimes in developed and developing countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 38-53.
    6. Genschel, Philipp, 2003. "Die Globalisierung und der Wohlfahrtsstaat: Ein Literaturrückblick," MPIfG Working Paper 03/5, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    7. Chun-Ping Chang & Chien-Chiang Lee, 2017. "The Effect of Government Ideology on an Exchange Rate Regime: Some International Evidence," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(4), pages 788-834, April.
    8. Fang‐Shuo Chang & Shiu‐Sheng Chen & Po‐Yuan Wang, 2020. "Politics and the UK's monetary policy," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 67(5), pages 486-522, November.
    9. Jesse Russell, 2011. "Hidden patterns in exchange rate regime choice," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 425-449, April.
    10. Crowe, Christopher, 2008. "Goal independent central banks: Why politicians decide to delegate," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 748-762, December.
    11. Rostagno, Massimo & Altavilla, Carlo & Carboni, Giacomo & Lemke, Wolfgang & Motto, Roberto & Saint Guilhem, Arthur & Yiangou, Jonathan, 2019. "A tale of two decades: the ECB’s monetary policy at 20," Working Paper Series 2346, European Central Bank.
    12. Mr. Christopher W. Crowe, 2006. "Goal-Independent Central Banks: Why Politicians Decide to Delegate," IMF Working Papers 2006/256, International Monetary Fund.

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