We argue that political parties will choose monetary institutions inorder to help them win elections and retain of ce. Increased levels ofeconomic openness in the industrial democracies have complicated thepursuit of of ce by altering the policy preferences of constituents anddecreasing the ability of cabinet ministers to deliver promised economicoutcomes. We contend that monetary commitments can help politicalparties manage diverse constituent interests, restore policyeffectiveness, and, ultimately, maintain their position in of ce.Therefore, we expect that xed exchange rates and central bankindependence can improve cabinet durability, especially under conditionsof economic openness.
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Volume (Year): 56 (2002) Issue (Month): 04 (November) Pages: 803-830 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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