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Choosing union: monetary politics and Maastricht

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  • Sandholtz, Wayne

Abstract

At their Maastricht summit, heads of state of the European Community (EC) countries agreed to establish a single currency and a common central bank by the end of the century. For students of international political economy, the treaty on monetary union offers intriguing puzzles: Why did EC governments commit themselves to such a far-reaching sacrifice of sovereignty? Why did national political leaders in some cases outrun public opinion in their enthusiasm for monetary integration? This study seeks a political explanation of the choices that produced the late-1980s movement for monetary union in Europe. It examines the conversion to monetary discipline in several EC states during the 1980s, arguing that the shift toward anti-inflationary rigor was a necessary precondition for discussions on monetary union. The article outlines three general options for a European monetary regime, based variously on unilateral commitments, multilateral arrangements, and full integration. Treating national preference formation as endogenous and requiring explanation, the article weighs five propositions that explain the motives and preferences of national leaders.

Suggested Citation

  • Sandholtz, Wayne, 1993. "Choosing union: monetary politics and Maastricht," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 47(1), pages 1-39, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:47:y:1993:i:01:p:1-39_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Hyoung‐kyu Chey, 2009. "A Political Economic Critique on the Theory of Optimum Currency Areas, and the Implications for East Asia," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(12), pages 1685-1705, December.
    2. Alison Johnston, 2012. "European Economic and Monetary Union’s perverse effects on sectoral wage inflation: Negative feedback effects from institutional change?," European Union Politics, , vol. 13(3), pages 345-366, September.
    3. Gerda Falkner, 2011. "Interlinking neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism: Sidelining governments and manipulating policy preferences as "passerelles"," Working Papers of the Vienna Institute for European integration research (EIF) 3, Institute for European integration research (EIF).
    4. Hefeker, Carsten, 1994. "GMU, EMU, and the Bundesbank: The political economy of recent EMS-crises," Discussion Papers, Series II 221, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    5. Zachary Selden, 2010. "Power is Always in Fashion: State-Centric Realism and the European Security and Defence Policy," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48, pages 397-416, March.
    6. James D. Morrow & Kevin L. Cope, 2021. "The limits of information revelation in multilateral negotiations: A theory of treatymaking," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(4), pages 399-429, October.
    7. Goodhart, Lucy, 2013. "Who Decides? Coalition Governance and Ministerial Discretion," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 8(3), pages 205-237, June.
    8. Stephen McBride, 2016. "Constitutionalizing Austerity: Taking the Public out of Public Policy," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 7(1), pages 5-14, February.
    9. C. Hefeker, 1994. "German Monetary Union, the Bundesbank and the EMS collapse," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 47(191), pages 379-398.
    10. Andrew Moravcsik, 2008. "The European Constitutional Settlement," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1), pages 158-183, January.
    11. Schäfer, Armin, 2004. "Beyond the Community Method: Why the Open Method of Coordination Was Introduced to EU Policy-making," European Integration online Papers (EIoP), European Community Studies Association Austria (ECSA-A), vol. 8, September.
    12. Katharina Holzinger & Jale Tosun, 2019. "Why differentiated integration is such a common practice in Europe: A rational explanation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(4), pages 642-659, October.
    13. Basham, James & Roland, Aanor, 2014. "Policy-making of the European Central Bank during the crisis: Do personalities matter?," IPE Working Papers 38/2014, Berlin School of Economics and Law, Institute for International Political Economy (IPE).
    14. Thomas König & Simon Hug, 2000. "Ratifying Maastricht," European Union Politics, , vol. 1(1), pages 93-124, February.
    15. Zachary Selden, 2010. "Power is Always in Fashion: State‐Centric Realism and the European Security and Defence Policy," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(2), pages 397-416, March.
    16. Lukas Haffert & Nils Redeker & Tobias Rommel, 2021. "Misremembering Weimar: Hyperinflation, the Great Depression, and German collective economic memory," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(3), pages 664-686, November.

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