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Political responses to interdependence: what's “left†for the left?

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  • Garrett, Geoffrey
  • Lange, Peter

Abstract

Heightened economic interdependence in recent years is commonly argued to have generated great pressures for convergence in economic policies across the advanced industrial democracies. Interdependence has clearly had a great impact on the types of economic policies that governments can pursue: they have been unable to pursue independent fiscal and monetary policies since the mid-1970s. Furthermore, all governments have been forced to attempt to promote the competitiveness of national goods and services in world markets and to increase the speed and efficiency with which national producers adjust to changes in global markets. There are, however, different policies consistent with these goals. Statistical analyses of economic policies since the mid-1970s show that governments of the left and the right continue to be able to enact distinctive supply-side policies that promote competitiveness and flexible adjustment and simultaneously further their partisan objectives.

Suggested Citation

  • Garrett, Geoffrey & Lange, Peter, 1991. "Political responses to interdependence: what's “left†for the left?," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(4), pages 539-564, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:45:y:1991:i:04:p:539-564_03
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    Cited by:

    1. Stephanie J. Rickard & Teri L. Caraway, 2019. "International demands for austerity: Examining the impact of the IMF on the public sector," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 35-57, March.
    2. Thomas Bräuninger, 2005. "A partisan model of government expenditure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 409-429, December.
    3. Patrick Lunz, 2013. "What's left of the left? Partisanship and the political economy of labour market reform: why has the social democratic party in Germany liberalised labour markets?," Europe in Question Discussion Paper Series of the London School of Economics (LEQs) 5, London School of Economics / European Institute.
    4. Camyar, Isa & Ulupinar, Bahar, 2013. "The partisan policy cycle and firm valuation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 92-111.
    5. André Corrêa d’Almeida & Paulo Reis Mourão, 2015. "The Irrelevance of Political Parties’ Differences for Public Finances - Evidence from Public Deficit and Debt in Portugal (1974 – 2012)," NIPE Working Papers 11/2015, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    6. Rickard, Stephanie J. & Caraway, Teri L., 2019. "International demands for austerity: examining the impact of the IMF on the public sector," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 86636, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Farrell Henry & Newman Abraham L., 2015. "Structuring power: business and authority beyond the nation state," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(3), pages 527-552, October.
    8. Cusack, Thomas R., 1997. "Partisan politics and fiscal policy," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economic Change and Employment FS I 97-306, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    9. Culpepper, Pepper D., 2001. "Employers, Public Policy, and the Politics of Decentralized Cooperation in Germany and France," Working Paper Series rwp01-002, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    10. Hanna Lierse & Laura Seelkopf, 2016. "Room to Manoeuvre? International Financial Markets and the National Tax State," New Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(1), pages 145-165, February.
    11. Oliver Pamp, 2004. "Partisan Preferences and Political Institutions: Explaining Fiscal Retrenchment in the European Union," Eastward Enlargement of the Euro-zone Working Papers wp24, Free University Berlin, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, revised 15 Oct 2004.
    12. Seeleib-Kaiser, Martin, 2001. "Ende oder Neubeginn der Sozialdemokratie," Working papers of the ZeS 16/2001, University of Bremen, Centre for Social Policy Research (ZeS).
    13. Ansell, Ben & Broz, Lawrence, 2015. "Global capital markets, housing prices, and partisan fiscal policies," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 60930, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    14. Ryan M. Weldzius, 2021. "The end of currency manipulation? Global production networks and exchange rate outcomes," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(3), pages 514-532, November.
    15. Ben W. Ansell & J. Lawrence Broz & Thomas Flaherty, 2018. "Global capital markets, housing prices, and partisan fiscal policies," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 307-339, November.
    16. Stephen Weymouth & J. Lawrence Broz, 2013. "Government Partisanship and Property Rights: Cross-Country Firm-Level Evidence," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 229-256, July.

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