Optimal disease eradication
AbstractUsing a dynamic model of the control of an infectious disease, we derive the conditions under which eradication will be optimal. When eradication is feasible, the optimal program requires either a low vaccination rate or eradication. A high vaccination rate is never optimal. Under special conditions, the results are especially stark: the optimal policy is either not to vaccinate at all or to eradicate. Our analysis yields a cost benefit rule for eradication, which we apply to the current initiative to eradicate polio.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal Environment and Development Economics.
Volume (Year): 12 (2007)
Issue (Month): 05 (October)
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- Andrea Galeotti & Brian W. Rogers, 2012.
"Strategic Immunization and Group Structure,"
Economics Discussion Papers
707, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Andrea Galeotti & Brian Rogers, 2012. "Strategic Immunization and Group Structure," Discussion Papers 1551, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Andrea Galeotti & Brian W. Rogers, 2012. "Strategic Immunization and Group Structure," Economics Discussion Papers 716, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Toxvaerd, Flavio, 2010. "Infection, Acquired Immunity and Externalities in Treatment," CEPR Discussion Papers 8111, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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