On the redistributive impact of privatizing a resource under imperfect enforcement
AbstractWe consider the redistributive effects of privatizing a resource previously exploited under free access. We assume that illegal extraction is punished but that the sanction is bounded by individuals wealth. First, we show that a segment of intermediate-wealth individuals is the most adversely affected from the regime change, while the poorest segment is not only less severely affected, but may actually gain from it. Next, we show how the authorities may prefer to choose an intermediate enforcement level in order to maximize the political acceptability of the regime switch among the local community.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal Environment and Development Economics.
Volume (Year): 11 (2006)
Issue (Month): 06 (December)
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Other versions of this item:
- Ambec, S. & Hotte, L., 2003. "On the redistributive impact of privitazing a resource under imperfect enforcement," Working Papers 200302, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- O13 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
- O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- Q21 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
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- Ostrom, Elinor (Ed.) & Schlüter, Achim (Ed.), 2007. "The challenge of self-governance in complex, globalizing economies: Collection of revised papers of a PhD seminar," Working Papers 47-2007, University of Freiburg, Chair of Forestry Economics and Planning.
- Stefan Ambec & Carine Sebi, 2011.
"The distributional impact of common-pool resource regulations,"
Indian Growth and Development Review,
Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 4(2), pages 123-141, September.
- Ambec, Stefan & Sebi, Carine, 2010. "The distributional impact of common-pool resource regulations," LERNA Working Papers 10.19.325, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
- Hotte, Louis & McFerrin, Randy & Wills, Douglas, 2013.
"On the dual nature of weak property rights,"
Resource and Energy Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 659-678.
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