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Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal Economics and Philosophy.

Volume (Year): 8 (1992)
Issue (Month): 02 (October)
Pages: 249-267

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Handle: RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:8:y:1992:i:02:p:249-267_00

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Cited by:

1. Powell, Benjamin & Wilson, Bart J., 2008. "An experimental investigation of Hobbesian jungles," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(3-4), pages 669-686, June.
2. Adam C. Smith & David B. Skarbek & Bart J. Wilson, 2009. "Anarchy, Groups, and Conflict: An Experiment on the Emergence of Protective Associations," Working Papers 09-03, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
   
   • Adam Smith & David Skarbek & Bart Wilson, 2012. "Anarchy, groups, and conflict: an experiment on the emergence of protective associations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 325-353, February.
3. François Facchini & Mickaël Melki, 2011. "Optimal government size and economic growth in France (1871-2008) : An explanation by the State and market failures," Post-Print halshs-00654363, HAL.
4. Powell, Benjamin & Stringham, Edward, 2009. "Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey," MPRA Paper 26097, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   
   • Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham, 2009. "Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 503-538, September.
   • Powell, Benjamin & Stringham, Edward P., 2008. "Public Choice and the Economic Analysis of Anarchy: A Survey," Working Papers 2008-7, Suffolk University, Department of Economics.
5. Shruti Rajagopalan & Virgil Storr, 2012. "The rationality of taking to the hills," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 53-62, March.
6. François Facchini & Mickaël Melki, 2011. "Optimal government size and economic growth in France (1871-2008) : An explanation by the State and market failures," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00654363, HAL.
   
   • François Facchini & Mickaël Melki, 2011. "Optimal Government Size and Economic Growth in France (1871-2008) : An explanation by the State and Market Failures," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 11077, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
7. Bryan Caplan & Edward Stringham, 2003. "Networks, Law, and the Paradox of Cooperation," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 309-326, December.
   
   • Caplan, Bryan & Stringham, Edward, 2003. "Networks, law, and the paradox of cooperation," MPRA Paper 26086, University Library of Munich, Germany.
8. Stringham, Edward, 2002. "The Emergence of the London Stock Exchange as a Self- Policing Club," MPRA Paper 25415, University Library of Munich, Germany.
9. Edward Stringham & Todd Zywicki, 2011. "Rivalry and superior dispatch: an analysis of competing courts in medieval and early modern England," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 497-524, June.

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