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Hume'S Non-Instrumental And Non-Propositional Decision Theory

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  • SUGDEN, ROBERT

Abstract

Hume is often read as proposing an instrumental theory of decision, in which an agent's choices are rational if they maximally satisfy her desires, given her beliefs. In fact, Hume denies that rationality can be attributed to actions. I argue that this is not a gap needing to be filled. Hume's theory provides a coherent and self-contained understanding of action, compatible with current developments in experimental psychology and behavioural economics. On Hume's account, desires are primitive psychological motivations which do not have propositional content, and so are not subject to the criteria of rational consistency which apply to propositions.

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  • Sugden, Robert, 2006. "Hume'S Non-Instrumental And Non-Propositional Decision Theory," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 365-391, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:22:y:2006:i:03:p:365-391_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Matson, Erik W., 2021. "David Hume, economic rationality, and policy: Symposium introduction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 833-835.
    2. Vanderschraaf, Peter, 2021. "Contractarianisms and markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 270-287.
    3. Matson, Erik W., 2021. "Satisfaction in action: Hume's endogenous theory of preferences and the virtues of commerce," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 849-860.
    4. Sugden, Robert, 2021. "Hume's experimental psychology and the idea of erroneous preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 836-848.
    5. Guilhem Lecouteux, 2013. "Reconciling behavioural and neoclassical economics," Working Papers hal-00819763, HAL.
    6. Jelle De Boer, 2017. "Social Preferences and Context Sensitivity," Games, MDPI, vol. 8(4), pages 1-15, October.
    7. Khalil, Elias L., 2017. "Socialized view of man vs. rational choice theory: What does smith’s sympathy have to say?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 223-240.
    8. Shiri Cohen Kaminitz, 2019. "Contemporary Procedural Utility and Hume’s Early Idea of Utility," Journal of Happiness Studies, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 269-282, January.

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