Hume'S Non-Instrumental And Non-Propositional Decision Theory
AbstractHume is often read as proposing an instrumental theory of decision, in which an agent s choices are rational if they maximally satisfy her desires, given her beliefs. In fact, Hume denies that rationality can be attributed to actions. I argue that this is not a gap needing to be filled. Hume s theory provides a coherent and self-contained understanding of action, compatible with current developments in experimental psychology and behavioural economics. On Hume s account, desires are primitive psychological motivations which do not have propositional content, and so are not subject to the criteria of rational consistency which apply to propositions.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal Economics and Philosophy.
Volume (Year): 22 (2006)
Issue (Month): 03 (November)
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- Guilhem Lecouteux, 2013. "Reconciling behavioural and neoclassical economics," Working Papers hal-00819763, HAL.
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