A Concept Of Progress For Normative Economics
AbstractThe paper discusses the sense in which the changes undergone by normative economics in the twentieth century can be said to be progressive. A simple criterion is proposed to decide whether a sequence of normative theories is progressive. This criterion is put to use on the historical transition from the new welfare economics to social choice theory. The paper reconstructs this classic case, and eventually concludes that the latter theory was progressive compared with the former. It also briefly comments on the recent developments in normative economics and their connection with the previous two stages.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal Economics and Philosophy.
Volume (Year): 22 (2006)
Issue (Month): 01 (March)
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- P. Mongin, 1999.
"Normes et jugements de valeur en économie normative,"
THEMA Working Papers
99-20, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Mongin, P., 1999. "Normes et jugements de valeur en economie normative," Papers 99-20, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
- Mongin, Philippe, 2006. "Normes et jugements de valeur en économie normative," Les Cahiers de Recherche 858, HEC Paris.
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