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A New View of Political Accountability for Economic Performance

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  • Chappell, Henry W.
  • Keech, William R.

Abstract

Most political support models imply that in evaluating economic performance, voters use a standard that would provide poor predictions of the future and leave the economy vulnerable to manipulation by vote-hungry politicians. Drawing on macroeconomic theory, we develop a simple standard of evaluation which encompasses a concern not only for current economic outcomes, but also for accurately assessed future consequences of current policies. We find that political support for the president can be explained as well by models that assume that voters use this sophisticated standard as by models that assume voter naivete.Our analysis questions the wisdom of measures typically used to assess voter evaluation of economic performance in a variety of theoretical contexts. The results also help to explain the absence of convincing evidence that governments exploit voter ignorance in manipulating the economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Chappell, Henry W. & Keech, William R., 1985. "A New View of Political Accountability for Economic Performance," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(1), pages 10-27, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:79:y:1985:i:01:p:10-27_22
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    1. repec:gig:joupla:v:1:y:2009:i:3:p:33-56 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Ghate, Chetan & Zak, Paul J., 2002. "Growth of government and the politics of fiscal policy," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 435-455, December.
    3. Jim Granato, 1996. "The Effect of Policy-Maker Reputation and Credibility on Public Expectations," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 8(4), pages 449-470, October.
    4. Alexander Boca Saravia & Gabriel Rodríguez, 2022. "Presidential approval in Peru: an empirical analysis using a fractionally cointegrated VAR," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 55(3), pages 1973-2010, August.
    5. David Smyth & Pami Dua, 1989. "The public's indifference map between inflation and unemployment: Empirical evidence for the Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan presidencies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 60(1), pages 71-85, January.
    6. Orazem, Peter F, 2017. "An Evaluation of the State of Iowa Revenue Forecasts, 1995 – 2017," ISU General Staff Papers 201712010800001036, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    7. Benjamin Fordham, 1998. "Partisanship, Macroeconomic Policy, and U.S. Uses of Force, 1949-1994," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(4), pages 418-439, August.
    8. John Goodell & Richard Bodey, 2012. "Price-earnings changes during US presidential election cycles: voter uncertainty and other determinants," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 633-650, March.
    9. Goodell, John W. & Vähämaa, Sami, 2013. "US presidential elections and implied volatility: The role of political uncertainty," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 1108-1117.
    10. R. Duane Ireland & Laszlo Tihanyi & Justin W. Webb, 2008. "A Tale of Two Politico-Economic Systems: Implications for Entrepreneurship in Central and Eastern Europe," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 32(1), pages 107-130, January.
    11. Berlemann, Michael & Enkelmann, Sören, 2014. "The economic determinants of U.S. presidential approval: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 41-54.
    12. Wilko Letterie & Otto Swank, 1997. "Electoral and partisan cycles between US economic performance and presidential popularity: a comment on Stephen E. Haynes," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(12), pages 1585-1592.
    13. Lafay Jean-Dominique, 1990. "L’Opposition Dans Le Systeme Pootico-Economique : Analyse Theorique Et Etude Empirique Du Cas Francais," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-18, January.
    14. Jerôme, Bruno & Jerôme-Speziari, Véronique, 2010. "Forecasting partisan dynamics in Europe," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 98-115, January.
    15. Daniel J. Richards, 1993. "What inflation policy do American voters want, and do they get it?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Sep, pages 33-44.
    16. Eric Dubois & Sonia Paty, 2010. "Yardstick competition: which neighbours matter?," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 44(3), pages 433-452, June.
    17. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
    18. Wit, Jorgen, 1999. "Social Learning in a Common Interest Voting Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 131-156, January.
    19. Amanat ALI* & Eatzaz AHMAD** & BILAWAL***, 2019. "SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEPRIVATIONS AND VOTERS’ PREFERENCES: A District Level Analysis," Pakistan Journal of Applied Economics, Applied Economics Research Centre, vol. 29(2), pages 181-199.
    20. Swank, Otto H., 1998. "Partisan Policies, Macroeconomic Performance and Political Support," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 367-386, April.
    21. Harold D. Clarke & Euel Elliott & Barry J. Seldon, 1994. "A Utility Function Analysis of Competing Models of Party Support," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 6(3), pages 289-305, July.
    22. Paul Renaud & Frans Winden, 1987. "Political accountability for price stability and unemployment in a multi-party system with coalition governments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 181-186, January.
    23. Grisard, Claudine, 2014. "La formation de l'accountability en situations conflictuelles," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/13959 edited by Berland, Nicolas.

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