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Feasible and Continuous Double Implementation of Constrained Walrasian Allocations

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Author Info

  • Guoqiang Tian

    (Department of Economics, Texas A&M University)

Abstract

This paper provides a simple, feasible, and continuous mechanism whose Nash allocations and strong Nash allocations coincide with constrained Walrasian allocations for pure exchange economies. This mechanism allows not only references and initial endowments but also coalition patterns to be privately observed, a feature missing from much recent work in implementation theory. Unlike most mechanisms proposed in the literature, our mechanism works not only for three or more agents, but also for two-agent economies, and thus it is a unified mechanism which is irrespective of the number of agents. In addition, our implementation result is obtained without modifying individuals' preferences and thus it improves the mechanism proposed in Peleg (1996) without having to define artificial preference relations on price messages announced by individuals.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Society for AEF in its journal Annals of Economics and Finance.

Volume (Year): 1 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Pages: 19-32

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Handle: RePEc:cuf:journl:y:2000:v:1:i:1:p:19-32

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Related research

Keywords: Incentive mechanism design; Walrasian allocations; Implementation;

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Cited by:
  1. Olivier Bochet, 2007. "Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 301-316, October.

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