This paper explores recreational land use planning issues, giving special attention to the applicability of benefit/cost analysis and the economics of property rights. The analysis suggests that the political process does not function as well as is often assumed, and an explanation is offered based on the public choice theory of government. An Alberta plan for its major water-based recreational resources is used to illustrate generalizations about recreational land use planning and the political process.
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