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Central Bank Independence and inflation: the case of Greece

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PANAGIOTIDIS, Theodore ()
TRIAMPELLA, Afroditi

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Abstract

This paper discusses the argument for Central Bank Independence (CBI) in the case of Greece. Using a time series approach and the last data available before Greece joined the EMU , the hypothesis that Central Bank Independence is important for controlling inflation is examined. Employing two indices, which serve as proxies for CBI, LegalCBI and TOR, the inverse relationship between CBI and inflation was confirmed. The interactions between the variability of inflation and CBI were also investigated. Furthermore, evidence was found to suggest that the rate of turnover Granger causes inflation.

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Article provided by UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO - FACULTAD DE ECONOMÍA in its journal REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA DEL ROSARIO.

Volume (Year): (2006)
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Handle: RePEc:col:000151:002112

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  1. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bratsiotis, George J, 2000. "Political Parties and Inflation in Greece: The Metamorphosis of the Socialist Party on the Way to EMU," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 7(7), pages 451-54, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Forder, James, 1996. "On the Assessment and Implementation of 'Institutional' Remedies," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(1), pages 39-51, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Mangano, Gabriel, 1998. "Measuring Central Bank Independence: A Tale of Subjectivity and of Its Consequences," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 468-92, July.
  5. Goodhart, Charles A E, 1994. "Game Theory for Central Bankers: A Report to the Governor of the Bank of England," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 32(1), pages 101-14, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(3), pages 353-98, September.
  7. Otero, Jesus & Ramirez, Manuel, 2006. "Inflation before and after central bank independence: The case of Colombia," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 168-182, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Hayo, Bernd & Hefeker, Carsten, 2002. "Reconsidering central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 653-674, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Cukierman, Alex, 1994. "Central Bank Independence and Monetary Control," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(427), pages 1437-48, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W, 2001. " Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 15(1), pages 3-40, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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