Gradual Nash bargaining with endogenous agenda: a path-dependent model

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Gradual Nash bargaining with endogenous agenda: a path-dependent model

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Julián J. Arévalo ()

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Julian Arevalo

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Article provided by COLOMBIAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL in its journal COLOMBIAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL.

Volume (Year): (2005)
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Handle: RePEc:col:000096:002773

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Article
- Julian Arevalo, 2004. "Gradual Nash bargaining with endogenous agenda. A path-dependent model," Colombian Economic Journal, Academia Colombiana de Ciencias Economicas, Colegio Mayor de Nuestra Senora del Rosario, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Universidad de Antioquia, Universidad de los Andes, Universidad del Valle, Un, vol. 2(1), pages 189-212, November. [Downloadable!]
Paper
- Julian J. Arevalo, 2005. "Gradual Nash Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda: A Path-Dependent Model," Game Theory and Information 0502004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Barry O'Neill & Dov Samet & Zvi Wiener & Eyal Winter, 2002. "Bargaining with an Agenda," Discussion Paper Series dp315, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Barry O'Neill & Dov Samet & Zvi Wiener & Eyal Winter, 2001. "Bargaining with an Agenda," Game Theory and Information 0110004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
- O'Neill, Barry & Samet, Dov & Wiener, Zvi & Winter, Eyal, 2004. "Bargaining with an agenda," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 139-153, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Flamini, Francesca, 2007. "First things first? The agenda formation problem for multi-issue committees," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 138-157, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Francesca Flamini, . "First Things First? The Agenda Formation Problem for Multi-issue Committees," Working Papers 2001_19, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow. [Downloadable!]
Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry & Young, Peyton, 2003. "Equilibrium selection in bargaining models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 296-328, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-18, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Thomson, William, 1994. "Cooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 35, pages 1237-1284 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Thomson, W., 1989. "Cooperative Models Of Bargaining," RCER Working Papers 177, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
Kalai, Ehud, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1623-30, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Ehud Kalai, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Discussion Papers 179, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson & Petyon Young, 2003. "Equilibrium Selection in Bargaining Models," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000466, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

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