Fiscal Policy Restrictions on Inflation Targeting: A Political Economy Approach
AbstractFiscal policy may impose restrictions on Inflation Targeting when Central Bank Independence (cbi) is institutionally weak and society has a real exchange rate target that is highly valued. In this environment, fiscal policy constrains the decisions of a committed, independent Central Bank (cb) regarding inflation. When such a pressure is strong enough to threaten cbi, monetary authorities react by setting an inflation target that differs from the one that would prevail in the absence of those threats. A simple model is used to illustrate this point where the cb takes into account the probability of survival as an independent institution.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE in its journal REVISTA DESARROLLO Y SOCIEDAD.
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central bank independence; fiscal policy restrictions; inflation targeting.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
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