In their model of addiction, O’Donoghue and Rabin obtain a counterintuitive result: a person that is fully aware of his self-control problems (sophisticate) is more prone to become addicted than one who is fully naware (na¨ıf). In this paper we show that this result arises from their particular equilibrium selection for the induced intra-personal game. We provide dominating Markov Perfect equilibria where the paradox vanishes and that seem more “natural” since they capture behaviors often observed in the realm of addiction. We also address the issue of why an unaddicted person could decide to start consuming and possibly develop an addiction. In particular, we show that their equilibrium implies that both naifs and sophisticates will slip into addiction. In contrast, by considering our results, only naifs will become addicted which is in accordance to the common intuition. Finally, we suggest a clear-cut way
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Frank J. Chaloupka & Kenneth E. Warner, 1999.
"The Economics of Smoking,"
NBER Working Papers
7047, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Chaloupka, Frank J. & Warner, Kenneth E., 2000.
"The economics of smoking,"
Handbook of Health Economics,
in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 29, pages 1539-1627
Elsevier.
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