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Der öffentliche Sektor in der Defensive

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  • Rainer Bartel

Abstract

Neoliberale Auffassungen sind längst hegemonial und internalisiert. Die wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Wurzeln finden sich in der Neuen Politischen Ökonomie. Sie sieht den Staat als Inbegriff von Egoismus, Ineffizienz und skrupellosem Machtstreben. Doch - richtig verglichen - arbeitet der Staat vielfach nur scheinbar weniger effizient als Private. Seine Hauptaufgabe ist die Produktion öffentlicher Güter, die mit der Herstellung privater Güter kaum verglichen und somit nicht mit undifferenzierten Methoden und gleichen Maßstäben gemessen werden kann. Der Staat ist Spezialist für öffentliche Güter, weil seine Bediensteten besonders gemeinwohlorientiert sind und die private Produktion öffentlicher Güter nur unter ganz engen Bedingungen effizient ist. Arbeitet der Staat teils tatsächlich weniger effizient, kann man die Anreizkompatibilität herstellen, statt durch Privatisierung Marktversagen zu mehren oder durch Außenvergabe die Administration noch komplizierter zu machen und zur Prekarisierung der Arbeit beizutragen. Privatisierungen in Bereichen der Daseinsvorsorge erweisen sich als weitere Entsolidarisierung der Gesellschaft. Ein Rückzug des öffentlichen Sektors ist zur Zeit falsch.

Suggested Citation

  • Rainer Bartel, 2007. "Der öffentliche Sektor in der Defensive," Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft - WuG, Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Statistik, vol. 33(2), pages 199-230.
  • Handle: RePEc:clr:wugarc:y:2007v:33i:2p:199
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    References listed on IDEAS

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