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Tax competition and the creation of redundant products

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Author Info
Charles A.M. de Bartolome

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Abstract

There are products that are assembled from kits but that, once assembled, are identical to other products. An example is the roll-your-own cigarette. Because the kit requires time to assemble, it is more costly than the assembled product; in the absence of tax competition, the kit is not bought or is `redundant.' I show that tax competition between regions supports strategies that tax the `redundant' product at a lower tax rate than its assembled counterpart, and it is bought. A welfare loss is thereby created.

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File URL: http://economics.ca/cgi/xms?jab=v40n4/CJEv40n4p1213.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 40 (2007)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 1213-1236
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Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:40:y:2007:i:4:p:1213-1236

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

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