Partial outsourcing, monitoring cost, and market structure
AbstractWe investigate firms' outsourcing decisions when production requires a large number of inputs. The novelty of our approach is that it provides a testable framework to characterize the equilibrium fraction of outsourced inputs. We demonstrate that intensified competition in a Cournot market for the final good typically enlarges the set of outsourced components relative to those produced in-house. The proportions of outsourced inputs are found to be strategic substitutes independently of whether firms compete with respect to quantities or prices in the market for the final good.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 38 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4
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