Antidumping protection and R&D competition
AbstractIn recent years antidumping protection has spread throughout the world. Evidence shows that antidumping often targets R&D-intensive sectors, raising a concern that it may adversely affect worldwide investments in R&D. We investigate this issue in a model of reciprocal dumping extended to a two-stage game, in which two firms first choose R&D levels and then compete in prices. We find that, when a single government institutes antidumping law, the protected firm decreases investment in R&D, while the constrained firm invests more. When both governments engage in antidumping actions, both firms invest more in R&D than under free trade.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 38 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
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- MIYAGIWA, Kaz & SONG, Huasheng & VANDENBUSSCHE, Hylke, 2010.
"Innovation, antidumping and retaliation,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2010064, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Kaz Miyagiwa & Huasheng Song & Hylke Vandenbussche, 2010. "Innovation, Antidumping, and Retaliation," Emory Economics 1009, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).
- Miyagiwa, Kaz & Huasheng, Song & Vandenbussche, Hylke, 2010. "Innovation, anti-dumping, and retaliation," Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven urn:hdl:123456789/284160, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
- Miyagiwa, Kaz & Song, Huasheng & Vandenbussche, Hylke, 2010. "Innovation, antidumping, and retaliation," CEPR Discussion Papers 7916, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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