Decentralizing hydro power production
AbstractWe analyse the production of electricity from n power stations in a dynamic model. Each power station's production of electricity is constrained by the quantity of water available to it (supply constraint) as well as limitations on reservoir capacity (storage constraint). We show that hydro power production can lead to two sources of welfare loss: suboptimal management of water resources and the exercise of market power. A monopolist minimizes the first source of inefficiency, whereas decentralized production in a competitive environment minimizes the second. The decision to introduce competition in hydropower production must account for these two opposite effects.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 36 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4
Web page: http://economics.ca/cje/
More information through EDIRC
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Abdessalem Abbassi & Ahlem Dakhlaoui & Lota D.Tamini, 2014. "Risk Aversion and Dynamic Games Between Hydroelectric Operators under Uncertainty," Cahiers de recherche CREATE 2014-4, CREATE.
- C. Robert Clark & Andrew Leach, 2005. "Energy Regulation in Quebec," CIRANO Burgundy Reports 2005rb-03, CIRANO.
- Talat S. Genc & Henry Thille, 2009.
"Investment in Electricity Markets with Asymmetric Technologies,"
0909, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Genc, Talat S. & Thille, Henry, 2011. "Investment in electricity markets with asymmetric technologies," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 379-387, May.
- Talat S. Genc & Henry Thille, 2009. "Investment in Electricity Markets with Asymmetric Technologies," Working Papers 0909, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Stefan Ambec & Claude Crampes, 2010. "Electricity Production with Intermittent Sources of Energy," LERNA Working Papers 10.07.313, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
- Finn R. Førsund, 2006. "The Anatomy of Market Power in Electricity Markets with Hydropower as Dominating Technology," ICER Working Papers 21-2006, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
- Crampes, Claude & Moreaux, Michel, 2008.
"Pumping Water to Compete in Electricity Markets,"
IDEI Working Papers
507, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- van Ackere, Ann & Ochoa, Patricia, 2010. "Managing a hydro-energy reservoir: A policy approach," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(11), pages 7299-7311, November.
- Rangel, Luiz Fernando, 2008. "Competition policy and regulation in hydro-dominated electricity markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 1292-1302, April.
- Haddad, Mohamed S., 2011. "Capacity choice and water management in hydroelectricity systems," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 168-177, March.
- Claude Crampes & Michel Moreaux, 2009.
"Pumped storage and energy saving,"
LERNA Working Papers
09.17.293, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
- KLAUS ABBINK & MOLLER, Lars Christian & SARAH O’HARA, 2005.
"The Syr Darya River Conflict: An Experimental Case Study,"
2005-14, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- KLAUS ABBINK & MOLLER, Lars Christian & SARAH O’HARA, 2005. "The Syr Darya River Conflict: An Experimental Case Study," Discussion Papers 2005-14, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Klaus Abbink & Lars Moller & Sarah O’Hara, 2010. "Sources of Mistrust: An Experimental Case Study of a Central Asian Water Conflict," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 45(2), pages 283-318, February.
- Ambec, Stefan & Crampes, Claude, 2012. "Electricity provision with intermittent sources of energy," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 319-336.
- Hoel, Michael, 2004. "Electricity prices in a mixed thermal and hydropower system," Memorandum 28/2004, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- C. Robert Clark & Andrew Leach, 2005. "La réglementation de l’énergie au Québec," CIRANO Burgundy Reports 2005rb-04, CIRANO.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Prof. Werner Antweiler).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.