Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Tradition and Common Property Management

Contents:

Author Info

  • Matthew A. Turner

Abstract

Since management of a common property resource can be undertaken only by a government of finitely lived agents, studying the behavior of such governments is a natural way to study common property management. The author proposes that we regard the choice of management objective by such a government as a 'move' in a game of sequential agents. Given this framework, it is shown that subgame perfect equilibria exist in which successive governments choose the same 'traditional' management objective. These strategies enable an economy to overcome any intergenerational externality. Thus, following a tradition of conservation may be a rational response to an intergenerational externality.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://economics.ca/cgi/xms?jab=v32n3/05.pdf
File Function: Full text
Download Restriction: Available to subscribers only. Alternative access through JSTOR and Ingenta.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 32 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 673-687

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:32:y:1999:i:3:p:673-687

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4
Email:
Web page: http://economics.ca/cje/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://economics.ca/en/membership.php

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Solow, Robert, 1993. "An almost practical step toward sustainability," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 162-172, September.
  2. Matthew A. Turner, 1997. "Parental Altruism and Common Property Regulation," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(4), pages 809-21, November.
  3. Kotlikoff, Laurence J & Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E O, 1988. "Social Contracts as Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time-Consistency Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 662-77, September.
  4. Cremer, Jacques, 1986. "Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 33-49, February.
  5. Olson, Lars J. & Knapp, Keith C., 1997. "Exhaustible Resource Allocation in an Overlapping Generations Economy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 277-292, March.
  6. Kandori, Michihiro, 1992. "Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 81-92, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is featured on the following reading lists or Wikipedia pages:
  1. Socio-economics of Fisheries and Aquaculture

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:32:y:1999:i:3:p:673-687. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Prof. Werner Antweiler).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.