Central Bank Independence and Growth: A Sensitivity Analysis
AbstractIn this paper, the Levine-Renelt robustness test is employed to examine the robustness of the empirical relationship between growth and various proxies for central bank independence. Experiments are made with a wide variety of the most comprehensive systematic measures of central bank independence currently available. The Levine-Renelt test implies that growth is not robustly correlated with central bank independence.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 31 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4
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- C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- O47 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Measurement of Economic Growth; Aggregate Productivity; Cross-Country Output Convergence
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- Maneschiöld, Per-Ola, 2010. "Consumption in Urban China and Monetary Policy - Consumi nelle aree urbane della Cina e politica monetaria," Economia Internazionale / International Economics, Camera di Commercio di Genova, vol. 63(3), pages 305-327.
- Haan, Jakob de & Kooi, Willem J., 2000. "Does central bank independence really matter?: New evidence for developing countries using a new indicator," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 643-664, April.
- Bernard Laurens & Marco Arnone & Jean-FranÃ§ois Segalotto, 2006. "The Measurement of Central Bank Autonomy," IMF Working Papers 06/227, International Monetary Fund.
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