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The (Non-)Equivalence of Tariffs and Quantity Restraints as 'Rent-Shifting' Policies

Author

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  • S. McCorriston
  • I. M. Sheldon

Abstract

In a differentiated oligopoly with quantity as the strategic variable, an optimal tariff can lead to a welfare gain. When a quantity restraint is used instead, this gain can be offset, since the quota induces anticompetitive effects. However, alternative quantity restraints, such as import quotas or voluntary export restraints, whether specified in volume or ratio form, will influence the strength of the anticompetitive effect. In this paper, the authors evaluate empirically the degree of nonequivalence between alternative trade instruments and the factors that likely influence it.

Suggested Citation

  • S. McCorriston & I. M. Sheldon, 1997. "The (Non-)Equivalence of Tariffs and Quantity Restraints as 'Rent-Shifting' Policies," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(4), pages 1220-1233, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:30:y:1997:i:4:p:1220-33
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    Cited by:

    1. John K. Ashton & Andrew D. Pressey, 2007. "The Regulatory Perception of the Marketing Function: an Interpretation of UK Competition Authority Investigations 1950-2005," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2007-, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    2. Stiegert, Kyle W. & Wang, Shinn-Shyr, 2003. "Imperfect Competition And Strategic Trade Theory: What Have We Learned," Working Papers 14589, International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium.
    3. Reimer, Jeffrey J. & Stiegert, Kyle W., 2006. "Evidence on Imperfect Competition and Strategic Trade Theory," Staff Paper Series 498, University of Wisconsin, Agricultural and Applied Economics.

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