Determinants of the Incidence of Group Incentives: Evidence from Canada
AbstractThe authors use Canadian data on four group incentive schemes to examine the determinants of the probability that a firm offers each scheme to its nonmanagerial workers and to production workers alone. They find that unionization lowers the incidence of group incentives, except for productivity gainsharing. Larger firms are more likely to offer share purchase plans to all nonmanagerial employees and profit sharing to production workers; cash bonuses are less common in larger firms. The authors find little indication that group incentives are either discouraged by machine-paced production or more common in firms with good industrial relations.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 30 (1997)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4
Web page: http://economics.ca/cje/
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- Long, Richard J. & Fang, Tony, 2013. "Profit Sharing and Workplace Productivity: Does Teamwork Play a Role?," IZA Discussion Papers 7869, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Anne Stévenot-Guéry & Loris Guéry, 2006. "Épargne salariale et stratégies syndicales:une analyse des représentations des syndicats à partir des discours," Working Papers FARGO 1060904, Université de Bourgogne - Crego EA 7317/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance).
- Thomas Cornelissen & John S. Heywood & Uwe Jirjahn, 2010.
"Profit Sharing and Reciprocity: Theory and Survey Evidence,"
Research Papers in Economics
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- Thomas Cornelissen & John S. Heywood & Uwe Jirjahn, 2010. "Profit Sharing and Reciprocity: Theory and Survey Evidence," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 292, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
- Heywood, John S. & Jirjahn, Uwe, 2009. "Profit sharing and firm size: The role of team production," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 246-258, August.
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