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The Evolution of Strategic Behaviour

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Author Info
Arthur J. Robson

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Abstract

This paper is a selective survey of recent work on evolutionary models of games. It is shown how evolution, in a literal biological sense, may have generated the attitudes to risk that are the basis of strategic behavior. Such attitudes to risk may or may not conform to the expected utility theorem. Although strategic behavior itself is bound to be importantly influenced by nongenetic mechanisms, these mechanisms may remain analogous to biological inheritance, at least in special cases. The theory of evolutionary games derived in this way is sketched and applications to various coordination games are discussed.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 28 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 17-41
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Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:28:y:1995:i:1:p:17-41

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  1. Geoffrey Hodgson & Thorbjørn Knudsen, 2006. "Dismantling Lamarckism: why descriptions of socio-economic evolution as Lamarckian are misleading," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 343-366, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. De Fraja, Gianni, 2006. "The Origin of Utility," CEPR Discussion Papers 5859, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Paul H. Rubin & E. Somanathan, 1999. "Humans as factors of production: an evolutionary analysis," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(7-8), pages 441-455.
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