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An Analysis of Common Sales Agents

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Author Info
Anming Zhang
Abstract

This article presents an analysis of common sales agents based on their precommitment role when sellers are better informed about the products than potential buyers. The author shows that an exclusive channel can create a cost, owing to the inability of exclusive sellers to commit themselves to sales impartiality. Independent noncooperative firms may use common agents as a precommitment to sales impartiality. The author demonstrates that common sales agency can arise as an equilibrium outcome in the absen ce of cost savings, marketing advantages, or the Bernheim-Whinston collusion effect. The analysis shows that common agency of this type can be welfare improving.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 26 (1993)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 134-49
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Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:26:y:1993:i:1:p:134-49

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  1. Richard Arnott & Paul Anglin, 1995. "Are Brokers' Commission Rates on Home Sales Too High? A Conceptual Analysis," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 302., Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

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