On the Job Screening, up or out Rules, and Firm Growth
AbstractThis paper uses on-the-job screening to derive a stochastic and dynamic model of hiring, promotion, and dismissal policies, and their impact on total firm employment and output. The model provides an explanation of the up-or-out rule observed in many organizations. It also provides an explanation for a cost-of-adjustment mechanism for the stock of human capital in a firm.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 25 (1992)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4
Web page: http://economics.ca/cje/
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Other versions of this item:
- O'Flaherty, B. & Siow, A., 1989. "On The Job Screening, Up Or Out Rules, And Firm Growth," Discussion Papers 1989_02, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
- O'Flaherty, B. & Siow, A., 1990. "On the Job Screening, Up or Out Rules, and Firm Growth," University of Chicago - Economics Research Center 90-11, Chicago - Economics Research Center.
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- Koch, Alexander K. & Nafziger, Julia, 2007.
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2973, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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- Rebitzer, James B. & Taylor, Lowell J., 2006. "When Knowledge Is an Asset: Explaining the Organizational Structure of Large Law Firms," IZA Discussion Papers 2353, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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- Braz Camargo & Elena Pastorino, 2012. "Learning-by-employing: the value of commitment under uncertainty," Staff Report 475, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
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- Abe, Naohito & Gaston, Noel & Kubo, Katsuyuki, 2005. "Executive pay in Japan: the role of bank-appointed monitors and the Main Bank relationship," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 371-394, August.
- Siow, Aloysius & Zhu, Xiaodong, 1997. "The creation of plants and firms," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 141-178, November.
- Cowen, Tyler & Glazer, Amihai, 2007. "Esteem and ignorance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 373-383, July.
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