Quota Leasing as a Competitive Strategy: A Story of Chicken Feed, Laying Hens, and Eggs
AbstractThis paper investigates why, under supply control by a marketing board, production quota originally given to downstream producers may ultimately end up in the hands of the latters' upstream suppliers who will lease them back to their original owners. A link between the extent of leasing and the price of quota is established. Finally, a rationale is provided explaining why such leasing contracts contain tying and exclusivity clauses.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 23 (1990)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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- Veltins, Michael A. & Schaller, Armin & Blum, Ulrich, 2004. "The East German Cement Cartel : An Inquiry into Comparable Markets, Industry Structure, and Antitrust Policy," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 04/04, Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
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