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Organizations in Economic Analysis

Author

Listed:
  • John H. Boyd
  • Edward C. Prescott
  • Bruce D. Smith

Abstract

Three economic environments are reviewed and, in each, organizations play an essential role. For an adve rse selection insurance economy, the authors find that when mutual in surance arrangements are permitted, an equilibrium necessarily exists and is optimal. This example, and two others, illustrate the problem s that may result from imposing organizational structure on an enviro nment rather than permitting the structure to be determined endogenou sly.

Suggested Citation

  • John H. Boyd & Edward C. Prescott & Bruce D. Smith, 1988. "Organizations in Economic Analysis," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 21(3), pages 477-491, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:21:y:1988:i:3:p:477-91
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    Cited by:

    1. Alessandro Giovannini & Maurizio Iacopetta & Raoul Minetti, 2013. "Financial Markets, Banks, and Growth : Disentangling the links," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(5), pages 105-147.
    2. Cheng Wang & Stephen D. Williamson, 1993. "Adverse Selection in Credit Markets with Costly Screening," Finance 9310001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Nov 1993.
    3. Krasa, Stefan, 1999. "Unimprovable Allocations in Economies with Incomplete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 144-168, July.
    4. Kilenthong, Weerachart T. & Qin, Cheng-Zhong, 2014. "Trade through endogenous intermediaries," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 262-268.
    5. Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2006. "The Threat of Capital Drain: A Rationale for Public Banks?," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 107, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    6. Demir, Ayse U. & Hall, Stephen G., 2017. "Financial structure and economic development: Evidence on the view of ‘new structuralism’," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 252-259.
    7. Kahn, Charles M. & Mookherjee, Dilip, 1995. "Market failure with moral hazard and side trading," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 159-184, October.
    8. Asheim, Geir B. & Nilssen, Tore, 1996. "Non-discriminating renegotiation in a competitive insurance market," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(9), pages 1717-1736, December.
    9. Pamela Labadie, 2007. "Anonymity and Individual Risk," 2007 Meeting Papers 637, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    10. Alberto Bisin & Piero Gottardi, 2006. "Efficient Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(3), pages 485-516, June.
    11. Mingming Leng & Mahmut Parlar, 2009. "Allocation of Cost Savings in a Three-Level Supply Chain with Demand Information Sharing: A Cooperative-Game Approach," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 57(1), pages 200-213, February.
    12. Lacker, Jeffrey & Weinberg, John A, 1993. "A Coalition Proof Equilibrium for a Private Information Credit Economy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 279-296, April.
    13. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/6o65lgig8d0qcro9p14jk1001 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Pierre Picard, 2014. "Participating Insurance Contracts and the Rothschild-Stiglitz Equilibrium Puzzle," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 39(2), pages 153-175, September.
    15. Zou, L., 1989. "Ownership structure and efficiency : An incentive mechanism approach," Discussion Paper 1989-55, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    16. Zou, L., 1993. "Ownership structure and efficiency : An incentive mechanism approach," Other publications TiSEM a72a05c2-b3f2-47c7-a003-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    17. Lazarova, E.A. & Borm, P.E.M. & van Velzen, S., 2005. "Contracts and Insurance Group Formation by Myopic Players," Discussion Paper 2005-89, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    18. Emiliya Lazarova & Peter Borm & Bas Velzen, 2011. "Coalitional games and contracts based on individual deviations," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 19(2), pages 507-520, December.
    19. Christopher Ferrall & Kjell G. Salvanes & Erik S, 2009. "Wages And Seniority When Coworkers Matter: Estimating A Joint Production Economy Using Norwegian Administrative Data," Working Paper 1200, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    20. Zou, Liang, 1992. "Ownership structure and efficiency: An incentive mechanism approach," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 399-431, September.
    21. Zou, L., 1989. "Ownership structure and efficiency : An incentive mechanism approach," Other publications TiSEM 14b0756c-17d9-4b9e-92cd-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    22. Jeffrey M. Lacker & John A. Weinberg, 1995. "The coalition-proof core in adverse selection economies," Working Paper 94-09, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    23. Daripa, Arup, 2008. "Optimal collective contract without peer information or peer monitoring," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 147-163, April.

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