Organizations in Economic Analysis
AbstractThree economic environments are reviewed and, in each, organizations play an essential role. For an adve rse selection insurance economy, the authors find that when mutual in surance arrangements are permitted, an equilibrium necessarily exists and is optimal. This example, and two others, illustrate the problem s that may result from imposing organizational structure on an enviro nment rather than permitting the structure to be determined endogenou sly.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 21 (1988)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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