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Tacit Co-ordination and Imperfect Information

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  • Michael Spence

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 11 (1978)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 490-505

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Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:11:y:1978:i:3:p:490-505

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Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Macleod, W.B., 1984. "A theory of conscious parallelism," CORE Discussion Papers 1984040, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. John R. Baldwin & Richard E. Caves, 1997. "International Competition and Industrial Performance: Allocative Efficiency, and Turbulence," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1809, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  3. Humphreys, Brad & Ruseski, Jane, 2009. "Tit-for-tat Strategies in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Games: Evidence from NCAA Football," Working Papers 2009-24, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
  4. J. Barkley Rosser, 2003. "A Nobel Prize for Asymmetric Information: The economic contributions of George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(1), pages 3-21.
  5. David Levine, 1981. "The Enforcement of Collusion in a Simple Oligopoly," UCLA Economics Working Papers 211, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. Kaufmann, Lutz & Roessing, Soenke, 2005. "Managing conflict of interests between headquarters and their subsidiaries regarding technology transfer to emerging markets--a framework," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 235-253, August.
  7. Baldwin, John R. & Caves, Richard, 1997. "Concurrence internationale et performance industrielle : allocation optimale, production optimale et turbulence," Direction des etudes analytiques : documents de recherche 1997108f, Statistics Canada, Direction des etudes analytiques.
  8. Baldwin, John R. & Caves, Richard, 1997. "International Competition and Industrial Performance: Allocative Efficiency, Productive Efficiency, and Turbulence," Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series 1997108e, Statistics Canada, Analytical Studies Branch.
  9. David Levine, 1982. "Enforcement of Collusion in Oligopoly," UCLA Economics Working Papers 247, UCLA Department of Economics.

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