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Allocation efficace d’un cout global d’environnement entre pays : permis negociables VS taxes ou permis negociables ET taxes ?

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  • Alain Bernard
  • Marc Vielle

Abstract

Une evaluation avec un modele mondial d’equilibre general. Dans un monde d’efficacite paretienne (ou de premier rang), l’internalisation des externalites telles que la pollution peut etre realisee par des taxes ou par des marches de permis, aussi bien dans un pays qu’a l’echelle internationale. La taxe environnementale est alors egale au cout social marginal de reduction des emissions de pollution, c’est-a-dire a la perte economique entrainee par une variation unitaire des emissions.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by CEPII research center in its journal Economie Internationale.

Volume (Year): (2000)
Issue (Month): 82 ()
Pages: 103-136

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Handle: RePEc:cii:cepiei:2000-2td

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