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How Should the European Banking Supervisory Authority Deal with Undercapitalised Banks?

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  • Markus Demary

Abstract

Markus Demary, Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln, argues in favour of a two-step introduction of a banking union for sufficiently capitalised and under-capitalised banks respectively. The latter should submit restructuring plans to the ECB that would be subject to its approval. Should a bank fail to meet the ECB’s requirements, it should be wound up using national liquidation funds.

Suggested Citation

  • Markus Demary, 2013. "How Should the European Banking Supervisory Authority Deal with Undercapitalised Banks?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 66(24), pages 11-14, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifosdt:v:66:y:2013:i:24:p:11-14
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Thorsten Beck & Daniel Gros, 2012. "Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision: Coordination Instead of Separation," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 13(04), pages 33-39, December.
    2. Hartmann-Wendels, Thomas & Hellwig, Martin & Jäger-Ambroçzewicz, Manfred, 2010. "Arbeitsweise der Bankenaufsicht vor dem Hintergrund der Finanzmarktkrise," IW-Analysen, Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (IW) / German Economic Institute, volume 63, number 63.
    3. Demary, Markus & Schuster, Thomas, 2013. "Die Neuordnung der Finanzmärkte: Stand der Finanzmarktregulierung fünf Jahre nach der Lehman-Pleite," IW-Analysen, Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (IW) / German Economic Institute, volume 90, number 90.
    4. Demary, Markus, 2013. "Ein Vorschlag für eine europäische Bankenunion ohne automatische Vergemeinschaftung von Bankverlusten," IW policy papers 16/2013, Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (IW) / German Economic Institute.
    5. Johannes Pockrandt & Sören Radde, 2012. "Reformbedarf in der EU-Bankenregulierung: Solvenz von Banken und Staaten entkoppeln," DIW Wochenbericht, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 79(42), pages 3-10.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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