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Zum Einfluss von Regierungsideologie in Geberländern auf die Verteilung von Entwicklungshilfe

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  • Danny Kurban
  • Niklas Potrafke

    ()

Abstract

Es ist zu vermuten, dass linke Regierungen mehr Entwicklungshilfe leisten als rechte Regierungen. Neue Forschungsergebnisse zeigen für 23 OECD-Länder, dass sich der Ideologieeffekt auf bestimmte Arten der Entwicklungshilfe konzentriert.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich in its journal ifo Schnelldienst.

Volume (Year): 66 (2013)
Issue (Month): 14 (07)
Pages: 30-34

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Handle: RePEc:ces:ifosdt:v:66:y:2013:i:14:p:30-34

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Related research

Keywords: Entwicklungshilfe; Geberländer; Parteipolitik; Ideologie; Entwicklungsfinanzierung; OECD-Staaten;

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References

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  1. Viktor Brech & Niklas Potrafke, 2013. "Donor Ideology and Types of Foreign Aid," CESifo Working Paper Series 4314, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game," Scholarly Articles 4552531, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  3. Milner, Helen V. & Tingley, Dustin H., 2011. "Who Supports Global Economic Engagement? The Sources of Preferences in American Foreign Economic Policy," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 65(01), pages 37-68, January.
  4. Potrafke, Niklas, 2009. "Did globalization restrict partisan politics? An empirical evaluation of social expenditures in a panel of OECD countries," Munich Reprints in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics 19286, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  5. Helen Milner & Dustin Tingley, 2013. "The choice for multilateralism: Foreign aid and American foreign policy," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 313-341, September.
  6. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 651-78, August.
  7. Tingley, Dustin, 2010. "Donors and domestic politics: Political influences on foreign aid effort," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 40-49, February.
  8. Helen V. Milner & Dustin H. Tingley, 2010. "The Political Economy Of U.S. Foreign Aid: American Legislators And The Domestic Politics Of Aid," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(2), pages 200-232, 07.
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